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ABSTRACT
iCheck is a system architecture that enables the banking system to increase the check pro-
cessing speed and decrease the check processing cost. The iCheck architecture provides a
secure, reliable, and widely available infrastructure for accessing the existing bank pay-
ment system over the internet. This is accomplished by designing, developing and inte-
grating the components necessary to decrease bank check processing time and to reduce
the need for human intervention in a secure form over open public networks. These com-
ponents are implemented in two main modules and demonstrate the inter-operability and
the infrastructure that can benefit banks by allowing them a consistent, secure, trusted way
of offering faster and cheaper services. This infrastructure should also enable the offering
of innovative new systems which take advantage of new developments in telecommunica-
tions technology and enhancements to the existing banking payment system.
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1.0 Introduction
Approximately 90 billion dollars each year are spent on the processing of machine printed
bank checks in the United States. Several steps in the processing of these checks are done by
computers, but most of the processing cost lies in the steps that require human intervention. The
most costly of these steps consists of the physical transportation of the checks and the identifica-
tion of the dollar (or the unit of currency) amount for which the check has been written. Employ-
ees at bank processing centers read the amount by hand and enter the quantity into a computer,
which prints the amount in MICR ink (Magnetic Ink Character Recognition) at the bottom of the
check. Thereafter, the check is physically forwarded through various banks where sorting
machines or MICR devices are used to aid in the processing. However, banks have not fully
exploited the decrease in processing costs that network connectivity, such as the internet, can
potentially provide since checks are still physically moved through the bank system.
Recently there has been a rapid expansion of the use of the internet. With more than 30
million users today, and 90 million projected to come on board in the next two years, the internet
is a new way for businesses to establish computer-based resources that can be accessed by con-
sumers as well as business partners around the world [25]. Not only are individuals using the
internet, but organizations and businesses are also including internet-connectivity into their infor-
mation infrastructure. Thus, the number of users and organizations reachable through this world-
wide network is greatly increasing. The internet is now seen by many organizations as an efficient
means to reach potential customers. However, secure methods of transactions are needed before
we will see widespread commercial use of the internet.
Taking into account the growth of the internet as a business model and the fact that there is
a need to reduce the cost of processing bank checks, a system is proposed that can autonomously
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recognize the amount for which a check has been written and can allow local banks to electroni-
cally transfer the information on the checks between themselves and other remote banks in a
secure fashion. Thus, our system can reliably and securely speed up the processing of checks and
greatly decrease processing costs.
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2.0 Background
There are currently a number of initiatives underway for the creation of secure cost-effec-
tive payment systems which attempt to take advantage of internet connectivity; yet none of these
systems take full advantage of the existing financial infra-structure. Furthermore, they require
users to change their money-spending paradigm since there is no paper currency or physical
receipts of any kind. We will now give a overview of the salient features of these systems.
2.1 Net Cash
Net Cash is a framework that supports "real-time electronic payments with provision of
anonymity over an unsecure network"[12]. Its infrastructure is based on currency managers that
are independently managed and distributed. These currency managers provide a point of
exchange between non-anonymous instruments such as electronic checks and anonymous elec-
tronic currency. If an organization wishes to set up and manage a currency server it has to obtain
insurance from an insurance agency similar to the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), referred to as the Federal Insurance Corporation (FIC), to establish an authentication ser-
vice. After the insurance has been obtained, the currency server sends its public key to the FIC
through a secure channel. The FIC then issues the currency server a "certificate of insurance for
producing and managing the currency"[12]. This certificate is then used by financial institutions
and other currency servers to verify the new currency server's authenticity.
The certificate is composed of a unique ID (Certif_id) to identify the particular currency
server named in the certificate, the public key of the currency server KP along with the date of
issue and an expiration date of the certificate. This certificate is sealed with the FIC's secret key
KSFIC. The coin itself consists of a symbolic currency server name, a currency server IP address,
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expiration date, serial number, and coin value sealed with the currency server's secret key KScs.
Thereafter, any coins issued by the currency server can be verified and authenticated:
Certificate: {Certifid, CSname, KPcs, issue_date, exp_date } KS
Coin: { CS_name, s_addr exp_date, serial_number, coin_val} KScs, Certif_id
A client that wants to decrypt the coin uses the Certifid to map to the appropriate certifi-
cate. After the client completes the mapping, it uses the corresponding FIC's public key KPFIC to
decrypt the certificate which contains the public key KPcs. Then, it uses KPcs to decrypt the
coin. Since KPFIC is FIC's public key, it can be sure that the currency server CS minted the coin.
There are four types of basic exchanges that provide the following services: coin verifica-
tion (i.e., double spending detection), coin exchange for untraceability, purchasing coins with
checks and cashing in coins for checks. These exchanges are showed in the figure below:
1. { check or coin, SessKx, transaction I KCS
2. {check or coin } SessKx
FIGURE 1. Generic exchange with the currency server (from [12])
Out of the four types of exchanges, only the latter two reveal the identity of X. In step 1, X sends
a check or a coin encrypted with the currency server's public key KCs together with the new ses-
sion key SessKX, and an indication of the transaction to be performed.
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If a coin sent by X was issued by the currency server itself then it can check for double-
spending. However, if the coin was issued by a remote currency server then the local currency
server forwards the coin to the remote one in exchange for a check payable to the local one. This
check is then cleared by the global accounting infrastructure.
In step 2 the server returns either newly issued coins or checks that have been cleared by
the currency server encrypted with the session key SessKx. Encryption with SessKx implicitly
authenticates CS to X and provides secrecy between X and CS.
NetCash allows an exchange between two agents, payor A and payee B, where both agents
are protected from fraud. In this scheme, A is guaranteed anonymity together with a valid receipt
or its money back, and B is protected from double-spending. A obtains a coin triplet <CB, CA,
Cx> from the currency server CS where each coin is identical in value and serial number. Futher-
more each coin is valid for a certain non-overlapping period of time (beginning with CB and end-
ing with Cx). The first two coins are intended for B and A respectively. In the first window of
time only CB can be used with CS. In the subsequent windows of time, CA and Cx can be used
exclusively. Futhermore, B's public key is encrypted in coin CB (so that only B can use the coin)
and in CA (to decrease the amount of state CS has to keep track of to be able to issue A a receipt).
Therefore, if A wants to pay B it will ask CS for a coin triplet to be used for B. Then A will keep
CX and CA and sends CB to B and waits for B to send back a receipt. If B does not give a receipt
to A, "A can query the currency server and check whether B spent the coin" [12]. If B spent the
coin, CS will give A a receipt. On the other hand, A can request a refund during the window
when CA is valid if the coin was never spent.
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2.2 NetCheque
NetCheque is a distributed accounting service supporting the credit-debit model of pay-
ment [15]. Clients using NetCheque maintain accounts with accounting servers in much the same
way that people maintain conventional checking accounts with banks. Similar to a paper check,
NetCheque bears an electronic signature, and "must be endorsed by the payee, using another elec-
tronic signature, before the check will be paid" [15]. These signatures are authenticated using
Kerberos. Furthermore, since NetCheque is a distributed accounting service, various accounting
servers arranged hierarchically (see figure 2) settle accounts when endorsed checks are
exchanged.
FIGURE 2. Accounting Hierarchy (from [15]).
The check itself contains the currency unit, the amount of the check, an expiration date, an
account server identification number, the payee, together with the signatures and endorsements
collected during the processing (verifiable by the accounting server against which the check was
drawn). Users can write and deposit checks via the write-check and deposit-check functions
respectively and determine their account balances using the statement function.
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UA = User Account U = User M = Merchant
AS = Accounting Server CA = Correspondent Account
To use write_check, a person passes as parameters the accounts against which the check
is to be drawn, the payee, the amount, and the currency unit. This function obtains a Kerberos
ticket that will be used to authenticate the payor to the accounting server and produces the cleart-
ext [15]. On the other hand, the deposit_check function reads the cleartext part of the check,
obtains a ticket from Kerberos used to authenticate the payee to the payer's accounting server,
endorses the check via a special Kerberos ticket called a proxy, and appends the endorsement to
the check. Then, an encrypted connection is opened to the payee's accounting server and the
endorsed check is deposited. If both the payee and payor have the same accounting server, the
accounting server will verify immediately if the check cleared. However, if they do not have the
same accounting server the payee's server places a hold on the payee's account until verifying if
the check clears. As the check is processed by multiple accounting servers, each server appends
its own endorsement to the check. If the check is rejected the payee takes whatever action (s)he
deems necessary. However, if the check clears, the payees' account is credited with the appropri-
ate amount.
2.3 Millicent
Millicent is a lightweight and secure protocol that enables commercial transactions over
the internet [7]. It is designed to support small monetary transactions, including amounts that are
smaller than a cent. It is based on the "decentralized validation of electronic cash at the vendor's
server without any additional communication, expensive encryption, or off-line processing"[7].
This system makes use of the scrip and broker abstraction. A scrip is vendor-dependent cash and
comes in two kinds: vendor scrip and broker scrip. A broker is the person who is in charge of
account management, billing, and establishing accounts with vendors.
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Scrip is similar to cash in the sense that it has intrinsic value. However, it only has value
when used with the particular merchant that issued it. In this sense it, is like a calling card or a
gift certificate which is merchant-dependent. Like electronic cash, "scrip will consist of a signed
message attesting that a particular serial number holds a particular value" [11]. The role of bro-
kers in this system is to serve as accounting intermediaries between vendors and customers. Cus-
tomers form ties with brokers in the same way that they do with banks and credit card companies.
Brokers buy and sell vendor scrip as a service to the vendors and the customers[ 11]. Futhermore,
broker scrip serves as a coherent currency for customers to use when buying scrip from vendors,
and for vendors to give as a refund for unspent scrip [11].
In this scheme, authenticity between customer and merchant is guaranteed by a secret key
used in an efficient symmetric encryption method such as DES or RC4. Scrip can be used to
establish the shared key. The secret key is generated when a customer buys scrip using a secure
non-Millicent protocol or purchased using a secure Millicent transaction [11]. Therefore, a user
has to keep track of the secret keys it has established with the merchants. For performance a hash,
such as MD5, is computed on the plain text of the scrip before signing. It is important that secret
keys not be very large because it might decrease performance. However, since the scrip value is
so small it is not worth the computational cost to try to break the key.
Two major potential problems are duplicating scrip and scalability of the system. To avoid
duplicating scrip, vendors will keep bit vectors corresponding to subranges of the issued serial
numbers for scrip until the scrip expires or is spent. Therefore, it is difficult for an adversary to
spend the forged scrip since double use of the serial number will be noticed. Another deterrent to
scrip forgery lies in the fact that the cost of breaking the protocol is greater than the value of the
scrip itself. However, each time a user needs scrip, (s)he has to buy scrip from a broker in real-
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time; this implies problems related to scalability. Futhermore, there is no mechanism that allows
merchant-independent scrip to be purchased by customers and used in transactions with multiple
vendors.
Finally, Millicent does not scale well to large payments since the encryption is not strong
enough. In general, it is best suited for transactions of little value. Millicent is also a system that
provides anonymity as long as the broker and the vendor do not collude. Overall, this system does
a fair job at providing a secure means for transacting small amounts of money but only will exist
in small niches of payment strategies because of its restrictions to small transactions.
2.4 Visa and Master Card's Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
Visa International and Master card announced on February 1, 1996 [25] the development
of a single technical standard for safeguarding payment card purchases made over open networks.
This standard is being published as an open specification for the industry. The specifications are
available to be integrated into any payment service and may be used by software vendors to
develop applications. It uses RSA-based public key cryptography to provide confidentiality of
information, ensure payment integrity, and authenticate both merchants and cardholders.
SET defines a variety of transaction protocols that use public and private key cryptography
to securely conduct electronic commerce. We will describe the following mechanisms:
1. Cardholder registration
2. Merchant registration
3. Purchase request
4. Payment authorization
5. Payment capture.
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2.4.1 Cardholder Registration
This protocol is defined between the cardholder computer and the certification authority.
Cardholders have to register with a Certificate Authority (CA) before they can send requests to
merchants. The cardholder initiates the protocol by requesting a copy of the CA's key-exchange
certificate. Then the CA responds by transmitting the key-exchange certificate which is used by
the cardholder to secure the payment card account number in the registration form request [25].
Then, the cardholder creates a registration form request message, generates a random key to
encrypt the registration form request message, and sends both the encrypted request message
together with the random key, all encrypted in the CA's public key-exchange key. On receipt of
these data, the CA determines the appropriate registration form, digitally signs it by generating a
message digest for the form, encrypts it with the CA's private signature key, and sends it to the
cardholder. To register an account, the cardholder fills out the registration which contains infor-
mation such as cardholder's name, expiration date, account billing address, and any addition
information the issuing financial institution believes necessary to identify the certificate requester
as the authentic cardholder. Then, the cardholder signs the registration information, generates two
random symmetric encryption keys, places one key inside the message (one key is used to encrypt
the registration and the other will be used by the CA to encrypt the response), and puts the other
key together with the account information and a random number (that will be used by the CA to
generate the certificate) into a digital envelope.
When the CA receives the cardholder's request, it decrypts the digital envelope to obtain
the account information and symmetric encryption key (which it uses to decrypt the registration
request). Then, the CA verifies the information contained in the registration request. However,
the details of how the CA obtains this information is outside the scope of the protocol. Once the
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information has been verified, the CA generates a random number that is used together with the
random number produced by the cardholder to generate a secret value. Then, the account infor-
mation and the secret value are passed through a one-way hash function and the CA signs the
cardholder certificate. Next, a response message containing the random number generated and
encrypted (with the symmetric key sent by the cardholder in the registration message) by the CA
is sent to the cardholder [25].
When the cardholder receives the response from the CA, it stores the certificate for use in
future electronic commercial transactions. Next, "the cardholder decrypts the registration
response using the symmetric encryption key that it sent to the CA in the registration message"
[25]. Finally, it combines the value that was send in the registration message with the CA's ran-
dom number to compute the secret value to use with the certificate.
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Cardholder Computer
Cardholder initiates
registration
Cardholder receives
response and requests
registration form
Cardholder receives
registration form
and requests
certificate
Cardholder receives
certificate
initiate request
initiate response
registration form request
registration form
cardholder certificate request
cardholder certificate
'4
Certificate Authority
Certificate authority
sends response
Certificate authority
processes request and
sends registration
form
Certificate authority
processes request and
creates certificate
FIGURE 3. Summary of carholder registration protocol (from [25]).
2.4.2 Merchant Registration
Merchants register with the CA in a similar fashion to cardholders. The merchant registra-
tion mechanism is composed of five parts, instead of the seven that the cardholder registration
process involves. The major difference is that after the merchant initiates a request, the CA
responds by sending a registration form. Therefore, the merchant does not have to explicitly
request a registration form.
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2.4.3 Purchase Request
This mechanism defines how the cardholder transmits the credit card account information
to pay for a given item. It assumes the cardholder and merchant have already registered and that
the cardholder has decided which items to purchase. The SET order process is begun when
"when the cardholder software requests a copy of the merchant's and gateway's certificates" [25].
When the merchant receives the request, it assigns a unique identifier to the message and sends
the merchant and gateway certificates.
Upon receipt the cardholder generates the Order Information (OI) and the Payment
Instructions (PI) and associates the unique identifier produced by the merchant with the OI and
the PI. Next, the cardholder generates a symmetric encryption key used to encrypt the PI and
sends the PI together with the OI. Then, the merchant receives the message and processes the
order including the payment authorization described in the next section. After the OI has been
processed "the merchant software generates and digitally signs a purchase response message,
which includes the merchant signature certificate and indicates that the carholder's order has been
received by the merchant" [25]. Then, this response is transmitted to the cardholder.
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Cardholder Computer Certificate Authority
initiate request
initiate response
purchase request
purchase response
Merchant sends
certificates
Merchant processes
request message
FIGURE 4. Summary of purchase request (from [25]).
2.4.4 Payment Authorization
This mechanism is defined between the merchant and the payment gateway when the mer-
chant is processing an order from a cardholder. The merchant creates an authorization request
which contains information such as the amount to be authorized and the transaction identifier
from the OI. Then, the PI and the authorization request are sent to the payment gateway. When
the payment gateway receives the PI and the authorization request, the payment gateway verifies
their authenticity and "formats and sends an authorization request to the Issuer via a payment sys-
tem" [25]. Once the payment gateway receives a response from the Issuer it generates an authori-
zation response message which contains an optional capture token (described in the next section).
The response is then sent to the merchant. Then, the merchant stores the authorization response
and capture token and lastly delivers the goods described in the original form.
May 23, 1997
Cardholder initiates
request
Cardholder receives
response and sends
request
Cardholder receives
purchase response
2.4.5 Payment Capture
This mechanism defines how the merchant receives his payment. There may be a large
gap in time between the message requesting authorization and the message requesting payment.
Once the merchant initiates this portion of the mechanism, the merchant sends the payment gate-
way the capture request and optionally the capture token. Futhermore, SET allows for multiple
requests to be made in parallel. When the payment gateway receives the capture token (if sent)
and the information in the capture request, the payment gateway creates a clearing request which
it sends to the Issuer. Then, the payment gateway creates and then signs the capture response
message and transmits the message to the merchant. Finally, when the merchant receives the cap-
ture response message, it stores the message to be used for reconciliation with payment received
from the acquirer.
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3.0 Motivation
The previously mentioned systems share something in common: they attempt to describe a
framework that supports realtime electronic payments over a network. Futhermore, the commer-
cial transactions are carried out solely in the electronic domain. The fact that these systems are
completely paperless is a double-edged sword. The advantage lies in the elimination of the paper
processing overhead; however, in the short term, we believe that in daily transactions, such as
buying groceries at the supermarket, people will feel more comfortable using paper cash and
checks than their electronic counterparts.
Paper-based money has been used for centuries. Since it has been in use much longer,
people are much more familiar with this type of currency than any of the electronic versions dis-
cussed so far [7][11][12][15]. Therefore, in the short-run, neither customers nor merchants will
switch to a completely paperless scheme. In light of this assumption, we propose a system that
will allow paper-based commercial transactions, in the form of bank checks, at the front end with
autonomous paperless processing thereafter. Thus, our system will serve as a model of transi-
tional technology between the current system, described in the following section, and the previ-
ously described systems [7][11][12][15].
3.1 Current Model for Processing Bank Checks
After a check is deposited at a local bank, it is forwarded to a processing center. At the
processing center, the courtesy amount block (where the user has written the quantity of the check
in numbers) is read by human operators and the quantity of the check is keyed in by hand into a
computer. After this stage, the amount for which the check was written is printed on the bottom
of the check in Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) ink. This ink contains an iron oxide
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so that the characters are magnetized and can be "read" by sorting machines and computer input
devices. Then, the checks move through a combination of three institutions: correspondent banks,
clearinghouses, and Federal Reserve Banks. The correspondent banks handle checking accounts
for some banks and provide geographic coverage for others (see figure 5). Clearinghouses
"receive the checks banks have credited to their own accounts and sort the checks for distribution
to the banks on which they are drawn"[5], while the regional offices of the Federal Reserve Bank
serve as clearing houses (see figure 5).
FIGURE 5. Complete check flow (from [5]).
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cashes own check deposits check
Suppose a consumer pays a merchant with a check from the bank Buser and the merchant
deposits the check at the end of the day at bank Bmerchan t. Since the user's account is not at this
location, Bmerchant mails the bank check to a processing center where the information on the
check is read by hand. Then, the checks are mailed to the federal reserve board FRBmerchant that
presides over Bmerchant. At FRBmerchant the checks are fed into high-speed MICR readers which
read the data, such as user's bank name/ID, the checking account number, and the dollar amount
to decide which FRB the check will be mailed to. Once the check reaches FRBuser it is fed into
another high-speed MICR reader to determine the bank it needs to be forwarded to. Then, the
bank check is sent to Buser and the data detected by the MICR reader is transmitted electronically
to Buser
FIGURE 6. Typical check route
3.2 Design Goals
We propose a system that decreases the need for human intervention when processing a
check. Furthermore, we propose a system that greatly decreases the number of banks the check
physically passes through. We will also decrease the amount of processing performed in the ana-
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P P p P P P,D
User - Merchant -- mer ProcessingCtr" -- merchantuser Buser
OR
Buser
P = Physically Transmitted
D = Digitally Transmitted
log domain, thus decreasing the total processing latency. Futhermore, we will allow the secure
electronic transfer of bank check data, thus eliminating and speeding several of the steps depicted
in figures 5 and 6 while maximizing the utilization of the available World Wide Web infra-struc-
ture.
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4.0 iCheck Model/Design
Before Tim Berners Lee wrote the first web browser at CERN in 1992, most client/server
applications communicated in proprietary formats and non-standard protocols built on top of the
Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). However, since that time a network service
built on top of existing local and wide area networks called the World Wide Web (WWW) has
grown to enormous proportions. Clients, called web browsers, on the WWW communicate with
web servers via a protocol called Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) which is built on top of
the reliable transport service provided by TCP [4]. Web browsers, using a Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) to identify a resource at the server, request information which is returned in the
form of a page of HTML commands. Web browsers parse this stream of commands and use tools
from its native operating environment to build display images representing the material in the
command stream. The command stream from the server may include text formatting information,
embedded graphics and other selectable links. Developers of client/server applications can now
take advantage of the available framework the WWW has provided them. For this reason, one
design goal of the iCheck system is to maximize the utilization of the WWW infra-structure.
Other design goals for our proposed system are to eliminate the need for human interven-
tion for reading the check's courtesy amount and to eliminate the need for the physical transmis-
sion of checks between Bmerchant and Buser in a secure fashion. We call our proposed system
iCheck. This system is composed of two main modules: the Bank Module (one client per bank)
and the Central Storage Facility (one global server).
The Bank Module initiates the processing by scanning the bank check into the electronic
domain. This module is responsible for authenticating itself to the Central Storage Facility and
securely uploading the scanned check. This is achieved by first negotiating a session key through
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a three phase handshake protocol (described in section 4.1.3) and then encrypting the data with
the session key. Furthermore, the Bank Module is responsible for securely downloading data
from the Central Storage Facility.
The Central Storage facility is responsible for storage, indexing, and retrieval of the bank
check data. Furthermore, it is also responsible for maintaining the data safe from potential intrud-
ers.
FIGURE 7. iCheck Global module view.
4.1 Bank Module
The Bank Module is composed of three main parts: Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
module, Check and Briefcase Object Packer module, and the security module. iCheck processes
bank checks through a set of three steps as follows:
1. Optical character recognition of the check's courtesy amount.
2. Creation of Briefcase Objects and Check Objects.
3. Establishment of a secure connection with a remote bank and transmission of the check image
together with the recognized data.
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4.1.1 OCR Module
This module is responsible for the automated reading of handwritten/typewritten amount
on the courtesy block using neural network techniques after the check has been scanned in. It is
divided into three main stages: preprocessing, recognition, and postprocessing [8, 26]. The pre-
processing stage itself consists of: a segmentation of the characters into individual units, normal-
ization, slant correction, thinning, and thickening. The recognition stage consists of a neural
network which takes the preprocessed data as an input to recognize the characters. Finally, post-
processing involves the examination of the numeral bitmap and output of the neural net to pro-
duce confidence measures about the predicted value.
The first step in preprocessing, called segmentation, separates alphanumeric symbols into
individual units. Based on general location and size within segment image, commas and other
punctuation marks are identified. Then, each digit is normalized to a 16 by 16 bit grid followed
by a de-slanting procedure which decreases the angle of slant [13, 14]. Thinning turns the
numeral into a one pixel thickness skeleton [9, 14]. A good skeleton "retains the connectivity and
structural features of the original pattern and, once defined, is then thickened to a thickness of two
pixels" [26].
In the recognition phase the 16 by 16 bit image is passed into a neural network based rec-
ognizer. The neural net, consisting of 256 input nodes and 40 hidden nodes is trained on extensive
amounts of data available from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) data-
base. The output consists of 10 nodes which are mapped to the 10 different digits.
In the postprocessing stage "each segment is passed through a second neural network that
has been trained with negative templates" [26]. Following the recognition stage, the output from
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the two networks are compared. If the outputs are not consistent the data is input back into the
segmentation for a second pass.
4.1.2 Check and Briefcase Object Packer Module
For several years industry and academia have been moving from procedural centered pro-
gramming to object oriented programming [22]. One idea from object oriented programming that
we decide to use in the Object Packer Module is data encapsulation since it is more logical and
neat to group together data that is semantically related. This way, information such as the CAB
and MICR are bound together in one entity: the Check Object inside a Briefcase Object.
This module is responsible for building the check and briefcase objects after the OCR
module recognizes and stores the Courtesy Amount Block (CAB) and MICR quantities as tempo-
rary variables. Then, the raw check image is JPG compressed and the new size of the image is
also stored which simplifies the Central Storage Facility parser (see section 4.2.1). It is important
to note that the image must be stored at a high enough resolution so that it is legally acceptable
(i.e., we will be able to recognize the signature). However, excessive detail stored in the image
will degrade the network transmission performance due to the increased bandwidth required to
transmit more data. Therefore, a careful trade-off needs to be made between image resolution and
transmission speed. Finally, the information in the temporary variables is used to create a Check
Object by storing the CAB, MICR, image length, and JPG image together.
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FIGURE 8. Check Object.
Each time a check is processed, a new Check Object is created and appended onto an
entity we call "Briefcase Object". The Briefcase Object is composed of a header followed by the
Check Objects. The header contains information such as the processing bank name and the num-
ber of Check Objects in the briefcase. We send a Briefcase Object, and not individual Check
Objects, for efficiency. In this way, the cost of transmission is amortized over the number of
checks in the briefcase.
FIGURE 9. Briefcase Object.
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A limit of 4 gigabytes was established for the length of the Briefcase Object due to the
limitations of form-based file uploading (the mechanism by which we upload the Briefcase to the
Central Storage Facility)[6, 23]. To enforce this size limitation, we check for the size of the cur-
rent Briefcase. If the difference between 4 gigabytes and the current size is at least the size of the
current Check Object, the Check Object is appended to the Briefcase. Otherwise, a new Briefcase
is created.
4.1.3 Network/Security Module
The goal of this module is to establish a secure connection between a Bank Module and
the Central Storage Facility to transmit the Briefcase Object. A secure connection is defined as a
connection where the data are privately transmitted and both the sender and the receiver are mutu-
ally authenticated to each other. In other words, an eavesdropper that listens to the communica-
tion channel between the Bank Module and the Central Storage Facility will not be able to
decipher the contents of the transmitted data. Futhermore, the Bank Module will be sure that it is
communicating with the Central Storage Facility and vice-versa.
Various factors affect our design decisions: encryption algorithm computation time, algo-
rithm robustness, and available cryptographical application programming interfaces (API). Only
by carefully examining these factors are we able to achieve our goal of secure transactions.
A factor that influences our design criteria is the time our encryption algorithms takes to
execute. We decide to use a public key algorithm to encrypt a session key which is later used to
encrypt the data using a private key algorithm (see section 4.1.3.1). The reasoning behind this
decision is based on the fact that in general, public key algorithms are approximately two to three
orders of magnitude slower than their private key counterparts[24] and the session key is orders of
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magnitude smaller than the data to be encrypted. For example on a '90 MHz Pentium, RSA Data
Security's cryptographic toolkit BSAFE 3.0 has a throughput for private-key operations of 21.6
Kbits per second with a 512-bit modulus and 7.4 Kbits per second with a 1024-bit modulus"[24].
By comparison, a private key algorithm such as DES is generally at least 100 times as fast as RSA
when implemented in software[24]. Furthermore, the encryption algorithm computation time is
proportional not only to the key modulus, but to the length of the input data. Therefore, the deci-
sion to use private key algorithms to encrypt the data is further substantiated since the length of
the data encrypted in iCheck can be up to 4 gigabytes long (orders of magnitude longer than the
key modulus).
We consider a number of public and private key algorithms that have been shown to be
secure by industry standards [10, 20]. The two public key algorithms we consider are El-Gamal
[20] and RSA. RSA's security is contingent on the difficulty of factoring large composite num-
bers while El-Gamal's is contingent on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem
[20]. The three private key algorithms we consider are DES, RC2, and RC4.
DES is the Data Encryption Standard, an encryption block cipher defined and endorsed by
the U.S. government in 1977 as an official standard; the details can be found in the latest official
FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards) publication concerning DES [21]. It specifies a
cryptographic algorithm to encrypt and decrypt 64-bit blocks of data under the control of a unique
key as defined in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS).
RC2 is a variable key-size block cipher. It is faster than DES and is designed as a replace-
ment for DES. It can be made more secure or less secure than DES against exhaustive key search
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by using appropriate key sizes [24]. It has a block size of 64 bits and is about two to three times
faster than DES in software. The algorithm is confidential and proprietary to RSA Data Security.
RC4 is a variable key-size stream cipher with a byte-oriented operations. The algorithm is
based on the use of a random permutation. Furthermore, eight to sixteen machine operations are
required for every output byte, and the cipher can run very quickly [19]. Although the algorithm
is proprietary, it has been scrutinized under conditions of non-disclosure by independent analysts
and it is considered secure [24].
One practical factor that affects the decision on how to implement our Network/Security
Module is the availability of cryptographical application programming interfaces for the previ-
ously mentioned algorithms. We decided to use CryptoAPI: a cryptographical API by Microsoft
for various reasons. CryptoAPI provides system level access to common cryptographical func-
tions such as key generation, key exchange, data encryption and decryption, hashing and digital
signatures. Also, CryptoAPI eases the process of making applications and cryptographic services
modular. This allows software developers that use CryptoAPI in their applications and to substi-
tute-in stronger Cryptographical Service Providers (CSP) modules as the need may arise. The
CryptoAPI programming model is similar to the Windows Graphical Device Interface (GDI)
model in that the CSP's are to CryptoAPI as device drivers are to the Windows GDI. Therefore,
just as "well-behaved" applications are not allowed to communicate directly with the hardware,
"well-behaved" applications cannot directly access the CSP's.
After taking into consideration both public key algorithms and the choice of CryptoAPI,
we determined that the best design decision is that RSA be used as the pubic key algorithm for
iCheck [6, 10]. Furthermore, after considering the various private key algorithms, we decided to
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use RC4 since it is both robust and quick by comparison to DES and RC2 (on a 120 MHz Pentium
based computer DES encrypts 1,138,519 bytes a second, RC2 encrypts at 286,888 bytes a sec-
ond, while RC4 encrypts at 2,377,723 bytes a second) [19].
4.1.3.1 Session Key Exchange Protocol.
As mentioned earlier, we decided to use a public key algorithm to encrypt a session key
which is later used to encrypt the data using a private key algorithm since public key algorithms
are in general much slower than their private key counterparts [24]. We explored two possible
ways to securely exchange a session key: the nonce session key exchange protocol and the three-
phase session key exchange protocol [19].
We first explored the nonce session key exchange protocol. In this protocol, there is a
sender that wants to give a message to a receiver. The sender creates a random session key and
encrypts the message with it. Then the sender encrypts the session key with the receiver's public
key and sends it to the receiver together with the encrypted message. When the receiver gets the
data it can decrypt the session key with its private key and then use the session key to decrypt the
message. This protocol is vulnerable to one form of attack: replay of transmitted data. In other
words, an eavesdropper that acquires copies of one or more encrypted messages and the encrypted
keys could at some later time send one of these messages to the receiver and the receiver will have
no way of knowing the message did not come directly from the original sender. To reduce the risk
of attack, we timestamp all the messages and have the receiver verify that the messages are cur-
rent. In case of a replay attack the receiver would notice this since the timestamp would have
expired.
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FIGURE 10. Nonce session key exchange protocol.
However, we decided to use the three-phase session key exchange protocol since it pro-
vides a way for two parties to create an authenticated, real-time connection between themselves
without the need for time stamps [19]. The end result of this protocol is a session key that is
shared by both of the parties involved. This protocol is known as a three-phase protocol because it
requires that the two parties exchange three packets of data in the process of creating the shared
session key. This protocol eliminates, instead of reducing, the risk of replay attack. Here, both
parties contribute a portion of the data that the negotiated session key is derived from. This proto-
col ensures that both the parties are current and are sending messages directly to each other. We
make the assumption that both parties involved already possess their own set of public/private key
pairs and that they have also obtained each other's public keys. Furthermore, we assume that the
parties have already exchanged human-readable user names. This is usually done at the same
time the public keys are exchanged, since the user name is included as part of each certificate (see
section 4.1.3.2).
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In the first phase of the protocol, the sender creates a random session key KA. The sender
then encrypts KA with the receiver's exchange public key PB. The encrypted KA is then sent to
the receiver. Upon receipt, the receiver decrypts KA with the receiver's exchange private key SB.
In the second phase of the protocol, the receiver creates a random session key KB of its
own. The receiver then encrypts KB with the sender's exchange public key PA. The encrypted
KB is then sent to the sender. The receiver then computes the hash H1 of KA, the receiver's name,
KB, the sender's name, and the text "Message 2" via the MD5 hashing algorithm [24]. This hash
value is then sent to the sender. The data must be hashed in the standard sequence, so the sender
will be able to properly validate it. Then the sender decrypts KB with the sender's exchange pri-
vate key SA. The hash value H1 is also received. The sending user then validates the receiver's
hash value H1 by creating a hash of its own containing the same data, and comparing the two hash
values. If the hash values do not match, then either the destination user has not been forthright, or
someone else is tampering with the data between the two parties. In either case, the protocol is
terminated and the communication link severed. If the two hash values do match, this tells the
sender that the destination user is presently on-line and in real-time communication. This is pri-
marily because the hash value contains KA, which was sent out encrypted with the receiver's pub-
lic key PB. Only the real destination user could have decrypted the session key and built the hash
value. Having the human-readable user names in the hash makes it possible to involve the users in
the process as an additional check [19].
In the third phase of the protocol, the sender builds up a hash value H2 containing KB, the
sender's name, the receiver's name, and the text "Message 3." This hash value is then sent to the
destination user. The destination user accepts the hash value from the sender and validates it by
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creating a hash of its own and comparing the two hash values. If the hash values do not match,
then the protocol should be terminated and the communication link severed. If the two hash value
do match, this tells the receiver that the sender is presently on-line and in real-time communica-
tion. This is primarily because the hash value contains session KB, which was sent out encrypted
with the sending user's public key PA. Only the real sending user could have decrypted the ses-
sion key and built the hash value.
FIGURE 11. Three phase session key exchange protocol.
Once the two parties have exchanged session keys and hash values and the hash values
have been properly validated, the protocol is complete. Each party can now independently create
a shared session key based on KA and KB that can be used to send encrypted messages to each
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other. To create the shared session key, each party must create a hash session key KA and session
key KB and then derive the key based on the value of the hash. The implementation details of this
procedure are outlined in the following paragraphs.
The three phase session key exchange protocol is implemented as a web browser helper
application that is launched before data is uploaded from the bank running the iCheck Bank Mod-
ule. First, the helper application calls CryptGenKey to generate the random session key KA and
calls CryptExportKey to encrypt the key KA with the Central Storage Facility's (CSF) public
key KB. Then, the helper application opens a socket connection to CSF, sends the encrypted key
KA to it, and listens to the specified socket for a response from the CSE The helper application
verifies the validity of the hash value H1 upon receipt of the response and extracts, using the
CryptIlmportKey function, the random session key KB produced by the CSF. If the hash value is
invalid the protocol is terminated and the communication link severed. Finally, the helper appli-
cation builds up a hash value H2 and sends it to the CSF through the already opened socket con-
nection. Below is pseudo code that describes the first portion of the protocol up to the point where
the helper application verifies the validity of hash value H1 sent by the CSP (for all the implemen-
tation details of the protocol, please see Appendix A).
// Get handle to the Cryptographical Service Provider.
CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, 0);
// Obtain the destination user's exchange public key. Import it into
II the CSP and place a handle to it in 'hDestPubKey'.
CryptGetUserKey(hProv, AT_KEYEXCHANGE, &hDestPubKey);
// Create a random session key KA.
CryptGenKey(hProv, CALG_RC4, CRYPT_EXPORTABLE, &hKeyA);
/I Export session key KA into a simple key blob.
dwBlobLen = BLOB_SIZE;
May 23, 1997
CryptExportKey(hKeyA, hDestPubKey, SIMPLEBLOB, 0, pbKeyBlob, &dwBlobLen);
// Send key blob containing session key KA to the CSF.
sendto (connectedport, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof (clientaddr))
// Receive a key blob containing session key KB from the CSF
// and place it in 'pbKeyBlob'. Set 'dwBlobLen' to the number
// of bytes in the key blob.
lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbKeyBlob, MAXLEN, 0)
dwBlobLen=lettersent;
// Receive a hash value H1 from the CSF and place it in
// 'pbHashValue'. Set 'dwHashLen' to the number of bytes in the hash
// value.
lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbDestHash, MAXLEN, 0)
dwDestHashLen=lettersent;
// Import the key blob into the CSP.
CryptImportKey(hProv, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0, 0, &hKeyB)
// Verify hash value received from the destination user.
// Create hash object.
CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash);
// Add session key A to hash.
CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyA, 0);
// Add destination user's name to hash.
CryptHashData(hHash, pbDestName, dwDestNameLen, 0);
// Add session key B to hash.
CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0);
// Add sending user's name to hash.
CryptHashData(hHash, pbSendName, dwSendNameLen, 0);
// Add "Message 2" text to hash.
CryptHashData(hHash, "Message 2", 9, 0);
// Complete the hash computation and retrieve the hash value.
dwHashLen = HASH_SIZE;
CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVALUE, pbHash, &dwHashLen, 0);
// Destroy the hash object.
CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
// Compare the hash value received from the destination user with
// the hash value that we just computed. If they do not match, then
// terminate the protocol.
if(dwHashLen!=dwDestHashLen II memcmp(pbHash, pbDestHash, dwHashLen)) {
printf("Key exchange protocol failed in Second Phase!\n");
printf("Aborting protocol!\n");
return;
May 23, 1997
4.1.3.2 Certification Authority.
Certificates are digital documents attesting to the binding of a public key to an individual
or other entity. They allow verification of the claim that a given public key does in fact belong to a
given individual. Certificates help prevent someone from using a phony key to impersonate some-
one else. In iCheck public key certificates are composed of a public key, name of the owner of the
public key, and a hash of the public key and name of the owner. All of this is encrypted with the
public key of an entity called a certifying authority (CA).
FIGURE 12. iCheck public key certificate.
In iCheck a trusted third party vouches for the authenticity of the public key keys used to
negotiate the session key in the three phase session key exchange protocol. The CA provides an
electronic certificate that vouches for the fact that a public key is owned by the sender and the
receiver of the three phase session key exchange protocol. This electronic certificate, itself digi-
tally signed by the CA, is stored by the sender and the receiver. Before initiating the three phase
session key exchange protocol both the sender and the receiver exchange their public key certifi-
cates. Upon receipt, the receiver uses the certificate to verify the sender's public key. At that
point the receiver is sure of three things:
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1. the original data was not altered (data integrity)
2. the message could only have been encrypted by the holder of that public key (entity authenti-
cation)
3. a trusted third party has vouched for the fact that the sender is in fact the holder of that key
Therefore, the strength of the public key certificate provides an acceptable level of assur-
ance to the sender that it holds a copy of the receiver's public key and vice-versa.
It is important to note that there may be a need for multiple CA's. Suppose that the sender
gives a certificate to the receiver. The receiver would verify the certificate using the certifying
authority's public key and, now confident of the public key of the sender, verify the message's sig-
nature. There may be two or more certificates enclosed with the message, forming a, hierarchical
chain, wherein one certificate testifies to the authenticity of the previous certificate. At the end of
a certificate hierarchy is a top-level certifying authority, which is trusted without a certificate from
any other certifying authority. The public key of the top-level certifying authority must be inde-
pendently known by being widely published. It is also important to note that the more familiar the
sender is to the receiver of the message, the less need there is to enclose, and to verify, certificates.
For example, if the Bank Module sends messages to the CSF every day, the Bank Module can
enclose a certificate chain, which the CSF verifies on the first day. The CSF thereafter stores the
Bank Module's public key and no more certificates or certificate verifications are necessary. A
sender whose company is known to the receiver may need to enclose only one certificate (issued
by the company), whereas a sender whose company is unknown to the receiver may need to
enclose two certificates. In general it is good to enclose just enough of a certificate chain so that
the issuer of the highest level certificate in the chain is well-known to the receiver. If there are
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multiple recipients, then enough certificates should be included to cover what each recipient
might need.
4.2 Central Storage Facility Module
The size of magnetic storage has been steadily increasing and will continue to increase at
an exponential rate according to Moore's Law. Therefore, prices have decreased at similar rate
for a given amount of magnetic storage. Magnetic storage decreases in cost primarily have
occurred because of improvements in three major areas [18]:
1. Magnetic disk storage cost/bit and absolute size
2. Network bandwidth increases which now permits moving data from the storage facility to the
client within a human reaction time
3. Display technology
It is now feasible to be able to store terabytes of data in one location. Examples of such
systems include the UC Berkeley's digital library research project having a capacity of more than
six terabytes, large collections of survey data for use by economists and social scientists covering
a wide range of sources such as government censuses and consumer surveys [2], and the Massive
Data Analysis Systems at the San Diego Supercomputer Center [3]. This is why we make the
design decision that all the check data processed in the OCR Module be stored in one location: the
Central Storage Facility (CSF). Therefore, we need a mechanism for uploading data onto the
CSF. The mechanism we use is called form-based file uploading and is available on web clients.
Currently, HTML forms allow the producer of the form to request information from the
user reading the form. These forms have proven useful in a wide variety of applications in which
input is necessary. However, this capability was limited because HTML forms did not provide a
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way to ask the user to submit files of data until recently. Service providers who needed to get files
from the user had to implement custom user applications. However, the mechanism necessary for
client side file uploads is now possible with the advent of form-based file uploading [23]. To have
form based file uploading available on a certain HTML file the software developer edits the
HTML document to include the form tag enctype ="multipart/form-data", method = "post", and
input type = "file". Anyone who views the given HTML file with a web browser will see some-
thing similar to the figure below. A user simply needs to enter the location of the file (s)he wants
to upload and then selects the Upload button.
FIGURE 13. Form-based file uploading.
4.2.1 Parser
The Parser is the part of the CSF Module that is responsible for processing data (in this
case the Briefcase Objects) that have been uploaded from with the form-based file uploading
mechanism. The first thing the parser does is to read the Header field of the Briefcase Object to
extract the identification of the bank that is uploading the data and to extract the field that indi-
cates how many Check Objects are in the Briefcase Object. Then, for every Check Object the
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Web Browser
Enter File Name: c:\documents\test.tx
Parser extracts the CAB, Image Length, MICR, and the Image and creates a HTML document
that contains all of the extracted data and the image.
Briefcase Object
Header
Check Object
Check Object
Check Object
FIGURE 14. Central Storage Facility parser.
May 23, 1997
Central Storage Facility Parser
S 0 0
0 * 0
CAB Image Length MICR Compressed
Image
.'Wý
Following is a code segment for the CSF parser:
fpUploaded = fopen(value[1], "rb");
fscanf(fpUploaded,"%s", strBriefcaseID); //get ID for briefcase
while(fscanf(fpUploaded,"%s", strCAB) != EOF) {
sprintf(strImagefname, "image%d.pgm", i);
sprintf(strImagefnamepath,
"c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\netbank\\conversions\\%s",strImagefname);
fpimage = fopen(strImagefnamepath, "w");
_setmode( _fileno( fpUploaded ), _O_BINARY );
fscanf(fpUploaded, "%c", &byte);
for(ibytecount=0; ibytecount<GREYMAPSIZE; ibytecount++) {
fscanf(fpUploaded, "%c", &byte);
fprintf(fpimage, "%c", byte);
I
sprintf(strBatCommand, "convert %s", strImagefname);
system(strBatCommand);
fclose(fpimage);
//_unlink(strImagefnamepath);
//Create HTML file
sprintf(strHtmlfname,
"c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\netbank\\conversions\\convertedata%d.html",i);
fpHtmlfname = fopen(strHtmlfname,"w");
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "%s", strheadhtml);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname,
"<B>BriefCaselD = %s</B><P>\n\n", strBriefcaseID);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<B>NumChk = %d</B><P>\n\n", i);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<B>CAB = %s</B><P>\n\n", strCAB);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname,
"<HR><IMG SRC=\"check%d.jpgV'\"><P><HR></BODY></HTML>",i);
fclose(fpHtmlfname);
i++;
_setmode( _fileno( fpUploaded ), _OTEXT);
fclose(fpUploaded);
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5.0 iCheck Scenario
Suppose you are at a grocery store and you write a check to pay for the food you just
bought. At the end of the day the merchant deposits the checks that (s)he has gathered for the day
into his/her bank account at Bmerchant. The merchant's bank collects the checks and feeds them
into the iCheck scanner which converts them into digital images. Then the OCR module recog-
nizes the quantity each check was written for and stores the data together with the digital image
into a Check Object and appends it onto to a Briefcase Object. At certain periods of the day an
authorized bank employee connects to a "Initiate Session Key Negotiation" web page provided by
the Central Storage Facility (CSF). The bank employee selects the "Initiate Session Key Negotia-
tion" button and waits for a confirmation message. Here, a session key is negotiated between the
CSF and the web browser helper application resident in the iCheck Bank Module. Then, an
encrypted connection between the Bank Module and the Central Storage Facility is opened and
the data are transmitted. Thereafter, the uploaded data is available for other banks to download.
FIGURE 15. Initiate Session Key Negotiation web page.
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When a user wants to download check data from the CSF (s)he goes to the "Download
Check Data Web" page. There (s)he finds another initiate session key button (used to encrypt the
data to be downloaded) and a pointer to the Secured Directory which will contain the encrypted
check data.
If a user contests the amount written on the check, the user can request a copy from the
bank. The bank will retrieve the digitized image and print a hard copy for the user. Since the dig-
ital image was stored at a high enough resolution for legal acceptability, the hardcopy is as good
as the original.
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Retrieve Initiate Session Key Negotiation web page
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select the "Start" button
send helper application initiator
session key
established
session key
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upload the encrypted Briefcase Object
FIGURE 16. Summary of the iCheck system communication between the OCR module and the Central
Storage Facility.
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CSF
6.0 Conclusion
6.1 How iCheck Succeeds to Meet Design Expectations
iCheck is a system architecture that securely allows the banking system to increase the
check processing speed and decrease the check processing cost. The iCheck architecture provides
a secure, reliable, and widely available infrastructure for accessing the existing bank payment sys-
tem over the internet. This is accomplished by designing, developing and integrating the compo-
nents necessary to decrease bank check processing time and to reduce the need for human
intervention in a secure form over open public networks. These components are implemented in
two main modules and demonstrate the interoperability and the infrastructure that can benefit
banks by allowing them a consistent, secure, trusted way of offering faster and cheaper services.
This infrastructure should also enable the offering of innovative new systems which take advan-
tage of new developments in telecommunications technology and enhancements to the existing
banking payment system.
6.1.1 Drastic Increase in Speed of Check Processing.
In current banking systems a check can take as long as two weeks to clear. Why is this so?
As we saw in section 3.1, a given check may be forwarded by multiple banks before it reaches its
original bank of issue. However, in iCheck, we can experience a vast increase in speed by moving
the data from the analog domain to the digital domain. For example, without loss of generality,
suppose a check in the analog domain takes 336 hours (2 weeks) to reach the original bank of
issue, while a check in iCheck takes 1 hour to reach the Central Storage Module (a very conserva-
tive estimate); this is more than a 3000% decrease in check processing latency.
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6.1.2 Drastic Decrease in Check Processing Cost.
Two factors are responsible for the decrease in check processing costs that iCheck pro-
vides: OCR technology and digital check transportation. By performing OCR on the check, we
eliminate the costs associated with employing a person to read the checks. For example, a person
employed to read checks at $5.00/hour for 8 hours/day working 250 days/year costs $10000/year
(and this is the cost for only one employee). This clearly surpasses any one-time cost associated
with the iCheck OCR. Also, a consequence, which needs no explanation, of scanning checks into
the digital domain is a decrease in check transportation costs.
6.1.3 Secure Transactions
The heart of iCheck's security protocols are based on the cryptographically safe algo-
rithms RSA and RC4. Breaking RSA would imply solving an NP-complete problem in polyno-
mial time which is believed by many mathematicians to be impossible [10]. Furthermore, RC4
has been scrutinized under conditions of non-disclosure by independent analysts and it is consid-
ered secure [24].
6.2 Future Work
Future work to be done on iCheck includes improving the Optical Character Recognition
(OCR) module to get higher recognition accuracy. Also, making the system scalable to handle
thousands of bank modules by having multi-threaded support. Furthermore, an in-depth study of
the economical, technological, and commercial repercussions that iCheck can potentially cause on
the banking system.
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6.3 How Can Other Systems Benefit from iCheck?
iCheck was designed in the client/server paradigm. Therefore, there is a clear demarcation
of the workload distribution that other client/server systems can benefit from. Furthermore,
iCheck's secure transactions are general enough to encompass the encryption of not only check
images, but of any other potential data. Finally, other electronic currency systems can use the
infra-structure and the cryptographical protocols in iCheck as ground work for their projects.
In summary, iCheck is an architecture that makes use of the existing financial and WWW
infra-structure. It requires no special hardware. It automates and speeds up costly procedures
such as reading the courtesy amount and check forwarding in a secure fashion. The technological
advancements that the iCheck system exploits will enable banks and corporations to streamline
and re-engineer back-office processes to provide faster check information, allowing check pay-
ment decisions to be made more quickly and with increased assurance. As a result, consumers, as
well as businesses, should enjoy quicker availability of funds, better safeguards against fraud, and,
in the near future, have greater and faster access to their checks' status at a customer site.
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Appendix A. Parser
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <io.h>
#define CABSIZE 50
#define FILENAMESIZE 40
#define PATHNAMESIZE 200
#define GREYMAPSIZE1512038 /* 38 bytes of PGM header (1237538)*/
#define BRIEFCASEIDSIZE 20
#define BATCOMMNANDSIZE 50
#define MAXPATH 200
#define MAXENTRIES (40) /* Max number of name/value pairs */
#define MAXNAME (20) /* Max number of chars in each name + 1 */
#define MAXVALUE (100) /* Max number of chars in each value + 1 */
typedef char NameStr[MAXNAME];
typedef char ValueStr[MAXVALUE];
int readstr( FILE *f, char *s, int size )
{
char ch;
do { /* Read characters into s until null byte is read */
ch = fgetc(f);
if( ch == EOF)
return -1;
*s = (char) ch;
s++;
size--;
I while( ch != '\0' && size != 0 );
if( size == 0 ) /* Ensure string is null-terminated */
*(s-l) = '\0';
return 0;
}
int read_info( char *fn, NameStr n[], ValueStr v[] )
int ix; /* NameNalue pairs read */
FILE *f; /* File pointer to info file */
f = fopen( fn, "rb"); /* Open info file */
if( f == NULL ) { /* return -1 on file open error */
return -1;
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}
for( ix = 0; ix < MAXENTRIES; ix++) { /* Process all name/value pairs */
if( read_str( f, n[ix], MAXNAME ) == -1 )/* Read name */
break; /* Endloop if end of file */
if( read_str( f, v[ix], MAXVALUE ) == -1 )/* Read value */
break; /* Endwhile if end of file */
}
fclose( f ); /* Close file */
unlink( fn ); /* Delete info file */
return ix; /* Return number of entries read */
}
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
FILE *fpUploaded, *fpimage, *fpHtmlfname;
char strCAB[CABSIZE], strImagefnamepath[PATHNAMESIZE];
char strImagefname[FILENAMESIZE], strHtmlfname[PATHNAMESIZE];
char byte;
char strheadhtml[] ="<HEADER>\n<TITLE> NETBANK </TITLE>\n</HEADER>\n<BODY><H 1>
The image data</H1>\n";
char strBriefcaseID[BRIEFCASEIDSIZE], strBatCommand[BATCOMMNANDSIZE];
int i=0, ibytecount;
FILE *textfile; /* File pointer to textfile */
char infopath[MAXPATH]; /* Pathname of infofile */
char textpath[MAXPATH]; /* Pathname of textfile */
NameStr name[MAXENTRIES]; /* Names from info file */
ValueStr value[MAXENTRIES]; /* Values from info file */
int entries; /* # of Name/Value pairs from info file */
int ix; /* Index variable */
if( argc < 2 ) return 1; /* End program if argument is missing */
strcpy( infopath, argv[1] ); /* Get infofile path */
/* Read all info data */
entries = read_info( infopath, name, value );
if( entries < 0 ) return 1; /* End program if file error */
/*************** Process the incomming data *****/
fpUploaded = fopen(value[1], "rb");
fscanf(fpUploaded,"%s",strBriefcaseID);//get ID for briefcase
while(fscanf(fpUploaded,"%s", strCAB) != EOF) {
sprintf(strImagefname, "check%d.pgm", i);
sprintf(strImagefnameppath,"c:\inetpub\\wwwroot\\netbank\\conversions\\%s",strImagefname);
fpimage = fopen(strImagefnamepath, "w");
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_setmode( _fileno( fpUploaded ), _O_BINARY );
fscanf(fpUploaded, "%c", &byte);
for(ibytecount-0; ibytecount<GREYMAPSIZE; ibytecount++) {
fscanf(fpUploaded, "%c", &byte);
fprintf(fpimage, "%c", byte);
}
sprintf(strBatCommand, "convert %s", strImagefname);
system(strBatCommand);
fclose(fpimage);
//_unlink(strImagefnamepath);//delete check%s.pgm file
//Create HTML file
sprintf(strHtmlfname, "c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\netbank\\conversions\\check%d.html",i);
fpHtmlfname = fopen(strHtmlfname,"w");
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "%s", strheadhtml);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<B>BriefCaseID = %s</B><P>\n\n", strBriefcaseID);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<B>NumChk = %d</B><P>\n\n", i);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<B>CAB = %s</B><P>\n\n", strCAB);
fprintf(fpHtmlfname, "<HR><IMG SRC=\"check%d.jpg\"><P><HR></BODY></HTML>",i);
fclose(fpHtmlfname);
i++;
_setmode( _fileno( fpUploaded ), _OTEXT);
fclose(fpUploaded);
strcpy(textpath, "userexec.txt");
textfile = fopen( textpath, "w" ); /* Open text file */
if( textfile == NULL) { /* end program on file open error */
fclose( textfile );
return 1;
}
for( ix = 0; ix < entries; ix++) { /* Print all info to textfile */
fprintf( textfile, "%s = %s\n", name[ix], value[ix]);
}
fclose( textfile ); /* Close textfile */
return 0; /* Done */
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Appendix B. Form Based File Uploading Sample HTML
Page
<HEADER>
<TITLE> Netbank Home Page </TITLE>
<link href="mailto:joesurf@athena.mit.edu"></HEADER>
<BODY>
<H1> Netbank Home Page</H1>
<HR>
In the area below enter the name of the briefcase object to upload.<P>
<HR>
<form enctype="multipart/form-data"
action="http://forrest.mit.edu/scripts/cgi-bin/upload.exe"
method=post>
Enter Briefcase Object: <input name="filename" type="file"> <P>
<input type="submit" value=" Upload">
</form>
<HR>
</BODY>
</HTML>
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Appendix C. Certification Authority
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <winbase.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <iostream.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#define TEMPFILE "delme.txt"
#define BLOCK_SIZE 200
#define BUFFER_SIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) // Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
#define DEFAULT_PORT 1625
#define MAXLEN 512
#define HASH_SIZE 256
#define SDESCRIPTION "Hash of name and key"
#define BLOB_SIZE 256
#define HASH_SIZE 256
BOOL searchfor(int argc, char *argv[],
char searchstring[2], int *whicharg)
{
int count;
// Display each command-line argument.
for( count = 1; count < argc; count++ )
if (memcmp(argv[count], searchstring, 2) == 0)
I
*whicharg = count;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
void main( int argc, II Number of strings in array argv
char *argv[], // Array of command-line argument strings
char *envp[] ) // Array of environment variable strings{
// repeat the loop?
char repeatloop;
//sockets declarations
struct sockaddr_in serveraddr, clientaddr;
int listensocket, connectedport, clientaddrlength, lettersent;
//Cryptography declarations
HCRYPTPROV hProv = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hSignature = 0;
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BYTE *pbSignature = NULL;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
DWORD dwSigLen;
//Winsock Version Verification
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
int err;
int portnumber;
int scannedchar;
FILE *hSource = NULL;
FILE *hDest = NULL;
int eof = 0;
char filetowrite[NAME_SIZE];
int dwBlobBufLen, dwNameBufLen, OutBufLen;
BYTE pbBlobBuffer[MAXLEN];
BYTE nameBuffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
BYTE outBuffer[MAXLEN];
DWORD dwCount;
int whicharg;
// Read in port number
II port is defined with -p, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-p", &whicharg))
{
portnumber = atoi(_stminc(argv[whicharg],2));
}
else
{
portnumber = DEFAULTPORT;
printf("Checking Winsock Versions.\n");
//Check versions of Winsock
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD( 1, 1);
err = WSAStartup( wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if( err != 0) {
printf("Error %d during Startup\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
return;
I
/* Confirm that the WinSock DLL supports 2.0.*/
/* Note that if the DLL supports versions greater */
/* than 2.0 in addition to 2.0, it will still return */
/* 2.0 in wVersion since that is the version we */
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/* requested.
if ( LOBYTE( wsaData.wVersion ) != 1 II
HIBYTE( wsaData.wVersion) != 1) {
printf("Could not find useable Winsock DLL\n");
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
WSACleanup();
return;
}
/* The WinSock DLL is acceptable. Proceed. */
listensocket = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (listensocket < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during create\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
printf("Socket created.\n");
// Assign listensocket to a local IP and port TEST_PORT
serveraddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serveraddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_ANY);
serveraddr.sin_port = htons ((short)portnumber);
if (bind(listensocket, (struct sockaddr *) &serveraddr, sizeof (serveraddr))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during bind.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
printf("Socket bound.\n");
listen (listensocket, 5);
// Repeat the filename query and certificate signing in loop
do
printf("Certificate authority ready and active on port %d\n", portnumber);
// need to replace this "write to file idea"
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-j", &whicharg))
{
if((hDest=fopen((_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)),"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening Writing file!\n");
}
strcpy(filetowrite, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
}
else
i
if((hDest=fopen(TEMPFILE,"wb"))==NULL) {
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printf("Error opening Writing file!\n");
}
strcpy(filetowrite,TEMPFILE);
// printf("Certification authority initialized.\nWaiting for connection.\n");
clientaddrlength= sizeof(clientaddr);
if ((connectedport = accept (listensocket,
(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr,
&clientaddrlength)) < 0)
printf("Error %d during connection.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
//printf("Connection successful. Receiving key.\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbBlobBuffer, BUFFERSIZE, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
// set dwBlobBufLen to size of public key blob received
dwBlobBufLen= lettersent;
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, nameBuffer, BUFFERSIZE, 0))<0)
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
// set dwNameBufLen to size of name received
dwNameBufLen = lettersent;
I printf("Key and name received. Generating certificate.\n");
// Get handle to the default provider.
if(!CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptAcquireContext!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
I Compute hash value and sign it.
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to send)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
I
// Add Sender's Public Key to hash.
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if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbBlobBuffer, dwBlobBufLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
II Add Sender's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, nameBuffer, dwNameBufLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
II Get Signed Hash Length to allocate memory
if(!CryptSignHash(hHash, ATSIGNATURE, SDESCRIPTION, 0, NULL, &dwSigLen)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
if((pbSignature = malloc(dwSigLen)) == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
goto done;
}
/I Put Signed Hash in pbSignature
if(!CryptSignHash(hHash, AT_SIGNATURE, SDESCRIPTION,
0, pbSignature, &dwSigLen)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
// Free up memory and destroy hashes
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
// Write size of signed hash to destination file.
fwrite(&dwSigLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing header!\n");
goto done;
}
// Keep track of outbuffer length
OutBufLen=sizeof(DWORD);
// Write size of name to destination file.
fwrite(&dwNameBufLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing header!\n");
goto done;
// Keep track of outbuffer length
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OutBufLen=OutBufLen + sizeof(DWORD);
/I Write size of public key to destination file.
fwrite(&dwBlobBufLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing header!\n");
goto done;
}
// Keep track of outbuffer length
OutBufLen=OutBufLen + sizeof(DWORD);
// Write signed hash to destination file.
fwrite(pbSignature, 1, dwSigLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing Signature!\n");
free(pbSignature);
goto done;
}
II Keep track of outbuffer length
OutBufLen=OutBufLen + dwSigLen;
// Write sender name to destination file.
fwrite(nameBuffer, 1, dwNameBufLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing Name!\n");
free(pbSignature);
goto done;
}
// Keep track of outbuffer length
OutBufLen=OutBufLen + dwNameBufLen;
fwrite(pbBlobBuffer, 1, dwBlobBufLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest)) {
printf("Error writing Public Key!\n");
goto done;
}
// Keep track of outbuffer length
OutBufLen=OutBufLen + dwBlobBufLen;
II Close destination file.
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
II printf("Certificate written to file %s\n", filetowrite);
// Read file in again and transmit the certificate
if((hSource=fopen(filetowrite,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening source file!\n");
I
dwCount = fread(outBuffer, 1, OutBufLen, hSource);
May 23, 1997
if(ferror(hSource)) {
printf("Error reading data from source file!\n");
goto done;
}
eof=feof(hSource);
// printf("Certificate Generated. Sending back.\n");
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, outBuffer, OutBufLen, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<O)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
// printf("Certificate sent.\n");
// Free memory used to store signature.
if(pbSignature != NULL) free(pbSignature);
// Continue?
closesocket(connectedport);
// Close destination file.
}while (1);
//while (strcmp(repeatloop,"y") II strcmp(repeatloop,"Y")-0);
done:
closesocket(listensocket);
}
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Appendix D.1. Three Phase Session Key Exchange Protocol
(Server)
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <iostream.h> // for command line arguments
#define NAME_SIZE 256
#define BLOB_SIZE 512
#define BLOCK_SIZE 200
#define BUFFER_SIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) // Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
#define TEMPFILE "delme.txt"
#define DEFAULTLOCAL_CERTFILE "mycert.txt"
#define DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_KEYFILE "sign.key"
#define SERVER_NAME "CSF'
#define NAME_LEN 60
#define HASH_SIZE 256
#define BUFFER_SIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) /I Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
#define SDESCRIPTION "Hash of name and key"
BOOL verifycertificate(HCRYPTPROV hProv,char *filetocheck,
char *signaturekeyfilename,
BYTE *pbKeyBlob, DWORD *dwBlobLen,
BYTE *pbDestUserName, DWORD *dwDestUserNameLen);
BOOL searchfor(int argc, char *argv[],
char searchstring[2], int *whicharg);
// verify certificate returns 1 if certificate checks okay, 0 otherwise
// input hProv-HCRYPTPROV cryptography provider
// input filetocheck-char null-terminated string of certificate to verify
// output publickeyblob-public key blob of destination user
// output dwBlobLen-Length of public key blob
// output pbDestUserName-null-terminated string for destination user name
// output dwDestUserNameLen-Length of name
BOOL verifycertificate(HCRYPTPROV hProv,char *filetocheck,
char *signaturekeyfilename,
BYTE *pbKeyBlob, DWORD *dwBlobLen,
BYTE *pbDestUserName, DWORD *dwDestUserNameLen){
FILE *hDest = NULL;
FILE *hSign = NULL;
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BYTE pbSignKeyBlob[BLOB_SIZE];
DWORD dwSignBlobLen;
HCRYPTKEY hSignature = 0;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
DWORD PublicKeyLen, HashLen, NameLen;
BYTE FilePublicKey[BLOB_SIZE], FileHash[BLOB_SIZE], FileName[NAME_SIZE];
int scannedchar;
if((hSign=fopen(signaturekeyfilename,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening source file!\n");
I
// Read signature key blob length from source file and allocate memory.
fread(&dwSignBlobLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSign);
if(ferror(hSign) II feof(hSign)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
pbSignKeyBlob == malloc(dwSignBlobLen);
if(pbSignKeyBlob == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
// Read signature key blob from source file.
fread(pbSignKeyBlob, 1, dwSignBlobLen, hSign);
if(ferror(hSign) II feof(hSign)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
H Import signature key blob into CSP.
if(!CryptImportKey(hProv, pbSignKeyBlob, dwSignBlobLen, 0, 0, &hSignature)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey!\n", GetLastError());
return(FALSE);
I
H check certificate
printf("Verifying certificate.\n");
if((hDest=fopen(filetocheck,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening Certificate file for examination!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
H Allocate memory for Hash
fread(&HashLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
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FileHash == malloc(HashLen);
if(FileHash == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
// Allocate memory for Name
fread(&NameLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
FileName == malloc(NameLen);
if(FileName == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
// Allocate memory for Public Key Blob
fread(&PublicKeyLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading Public Key!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
FilePublicKey == malloc(PublicKeyLen);
if(FilePublicKey == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
// Read signature
fread(FileHash, 1, HashLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading hash!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
// Read name
fread(FileName, 1, NameLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading name!\n");
return(FALSE);
// Read public key
fread(FilePublicKey, 1, PublicKeyLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading key!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
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// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to send)!\n", GetLastErroro);
return(FALSE);
I
// Add Sender's Public Key to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, FilePublicKey, PublicKeyLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastError());
return(FALSE);
}
II Add Sender's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, FileName, NameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastError());
return(FALSE);
}
if(!CryptVerifySignature(hHash, FileHash, HashLen, hSignature, SDESCRIPTION, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptVerifySignature!\n", GetLastErroro);
printf("Certificate invalid\n");
return(FALSE);
//delete file
I
else
II printf("Certificate %s verified and ready to use\n",filetocheck);
memcpy(pbKeyBlob,FilePublicKey,PublicKeyLen);
*dwBlobLen=PublicKeyLen;
memcpy(pbDestUserName,FileName,NameLen);
//pbDestUserName= FileName
*dwDestUserNameLen=NameLen;
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
if(hSign != NULL) fclose(hSign);
return(TRUE);
}
// searchfor finds a switch in the command line and returns the
// argument number of the switch
// searchfor returns true if the searchstring is found
// argc (int) = number of command line items (excluding call)
// argv (*char) = string values of these command line items
// searchstring[2] (char) = switch to be searched for i.e. "-g"
// whicharg (int) = returns the value of the found arg
BOOL searchfor(int argc, char *argv[],
char searchstring[2], int *whicharg)
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int count;
// Display each command-line argument.
for( count = 1; count < argc; count++ )
if (memcmp(argv[count], searchstring, 2) == 0)
{
*whicharg = count;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;}
void main(int argc, // Number of strings in array argv
char *argv[], // Array of command-line argument strings
char *envp[] ) // Array of environment variable strings
{
//sockets declarations
#define DEFAULTPORT 1625
#define MAXLEN 1000
#define HASHSIZE 256
#define CERT _SIZE 512
#define BUFFER_SIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) // Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
struct sockaddr_in serveraddr, clientaddr;
int listensocket, connectedport, clientaddrlength, lettersent;
//Winsock Version Verification
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
int err;
char signaturekeyfilename[60];
//Cryptography declarations
HCRYPTPROV hProv = 0;
BYTE pbDestName[NAMESIZE];
//char pbDestName[NAME_SIZE];
DWORD dwDestNameLen;
BYTE pbSendName[NAME_SIZE];
//char pbSendName[NAME_SIZE];
DWORD dwSendNameLen;
HCRYPTKEY hSendPubKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hMyPubKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hSharedKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hKeyA = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hKeyB = 0;
BYTE pbKeyBlob[BLOBSIZE];
DWORD dwBlobLen;
BYTE pbHash[HASH_SIZE];
DWORD dwHashLen;
BYTE pbSendHash[HASH_SIZE];
DWORD dwSendHashLen;
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HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
BYTE pbCert[CERT_SIZE];
DWORD Certlength;
DWORD Certpartlength;
BYTE pboutbuffer[MAXLEN];
//File access variables
FILE *hSource = NULL;
FILE *hRemoteCert = NULL;
FILE *hDest = NULL;
FILE *hRecvFile = NULL;
int eof = 0;
// room for padding, etc.
BYTE pbBuffer[BUFFERSIZE];
DWORD dwCount;
char localcertfilename[60], keyfilename[60], remotecertfilename[60];
char RecvBuffer[BUFFERSIZE], recvfilename[60];
int scannedchar;
int portnumber;
int whicharg;
LONG ReceiveLen;
LONG BytesReceived;
// Read in client (local) port number
// client port is defined with -p, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-p", &whicharg))
{
portnumber = atoi(_stminc(argv[whicharg],2));
}
else
{
portnumber = DEFAULTPORT;
}
II Read in LocalCertificate
II local certificate is defined with -m, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-m", &whicharg))
{
if((hSource=fopen((_strninc(argv [whicharg],2)),"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening your certificate file!\n");
goto done;
}
strcpy(localcertfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
I
else
{
if((hSource=fopen(DEFAULT LOCAL_CERTFILE,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening your certificate file!\n");
goto done;
I
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strcpy(localcertfilename, DEFAULTLOCAL_CERTFILE);
II Read in junk filename
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-j", &whicharg))
{
if((hRemoteCert=fopen((_stminc(argv[whicharg],2)),"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening Writing file!\n");
I
strcpy(remotecertfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
I
else
{
if((hRemoteCert=fopen(TEMPFILE,"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening certificate destination file!\n");
I
strcpy(remotecertfilename,TEMPFILE);
I
// Get handle to the default provider.
if(!CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptAcquireContext!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
//Initiate connection
//Check versions of Winsock
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD( 1, 1 );
err = WSAStartup( wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if( err !=0) {
printf("Error %d during Startup\n", WSAGetLastError());
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
return;
}
/* Confirm that the WinSock DLL supports 2.0.*/
/* Note that if the DLL supports versions greater */
/* than 2.0 in addition to 2.0, it will still return */
/* 2.0 in wVersion since that is the version we */
/* requested. */
if ( LOBYTE( wsaData.wVersion) != 111
HIBYTE( wsaData.wVersion) != 1) (
printf("Could not find useable Winsock DLL\n");
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
WSACleanup();
return;
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I/* The WinSock DLL is acceptable. Proceed. */
listensocket = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (listensocket < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during create\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
I
//printf("Socket created.\n");
// Assign listensocket to a local IP and port TEST_PORT
serveraddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serveraddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_ANY);
serveraddr.sin_port = htons ((short)portnumber);
if (bind(listensocket, (struct sockaddr *) &serveraddr, sizeof (serveraddr))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during bind.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
listen (listensocket, 5);
//repeat this whole loop infinitely
do{
printf("Server active on port %d\n", portnumber);
clientaddrlength= sizeof(clientaddr);
if ((connectedport = accept (listensocket, (struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, &clientaddrlength)) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during connection.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
I
printf("Connection successful.\n");
// Receive a key blob containing certificate
//printf("Receiving remote Certificate\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbCert, CERT_SIZE, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive of certificate.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
I
// Write data to destination file.
fwrite(pbCert, 1, lettersent, hRemoteCert);
if(ferror(hRemoteCert)) {
printf("Error writing data to remote certificate file!\n");
goto done;
I
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if(hRemoteCert != NULL) fclose(hRemoteCert);
// Obtain the sending user's exchange public key. Import it into the
II CSP and place a handle to it in 'hSendPubKey'.
// printf("Sending my certificate.\n");
II Get certificate length from file header
fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+sizeof(DWORD);
fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+Certlength+sizeof(DWORD);
fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+Certlength+sizeof(DWORD);
//rewind to start and read again
rewind(hSource);
dwCount = fread(pboutbuffer, 1, Certlength, hSource);
if(ferror(hSource)) {
printf("Error reading data from source file!\n");
goto done;
}
eof=feof(hSource);
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pboutbuffer, Certlength, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<O)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
//Signature key filename -S
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-S", &whicharg))
{
strcpy(signaturekeyfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
else
I
strcpy(signaturekeyfilename, DEFAULTSIGNATUREKEYFILE);
if (!verifycertificate(hProv, remotecertfilename, signaturekeyfilename,
pbKeyBlob, &dwBlobLen,
pbDestName, &dwDestNameLen))
I
printf("Could not verify certificate.\n");
goto done;
I
// Import key blob into CSP.
if(!CryptImportKey(hProv, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0, 0, &hSendPubKey)) {
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printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
//Do I need this line? I'm overwriting the DestPubKey
if(!CryptGetUserKey(hProv, AT_KEYEXCHANGE, &hMyPubKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetUserKey\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Obtain the sending user's name. This is usually done at the
// same time the public key was obtained. Place this in
// 'pbSendName' and set 'dwSendNameLen' to the number of bytes in
// the name.
// Hardcode the server's name as "CSF'
strcpy(pbSendName,SERVER NAME);
dwSendNameLen=strlen(pbSendName);
// Receive a key blob containing session key A from the sending user
// and place it in 'pbKeyBlob'. Set 'dwBlobLen' to the number of
// bytes in the key blob.
// printf("Receiving Session Key A.\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbKeyBlob, MAXLEN, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastError();
goto done;
}
dwBlobLen=lettersent;
// Import the key blob into the CSP.
if(!CryptImportKey(hProv, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0, 0, &hKeyA)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey KeyA!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Create a random session key (session key B). Because this key is
// going to be used solely for key exchange and not encryption, it
// does not matter which algorithm you specify here.
if(!CryptGenKey(hProv, CALG_RC2, CRYPTEXPORTABLE, &hKeyB)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGenKey KeyB!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Export session key B into a simple key blob.
dwBlobLen = BLOB_SIZE;
if(!CryptExportKey(hKeyB, hSendPubKey,
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SIMPLEBLOB, 0, pbKeyBlob, &dwBlobLen)) I
printf("Error %x during CryptExportKey KeyB!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Transmit key blob containing session key B to the sending user.
//printf("Sending Session Key B.\n");
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbKeyBlob,
dwBlobLen, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr,
sizeof (clientaddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
// Compute hash value and transmit it to the sending user.
I-
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) I
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to send)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add session key A to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyA, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyA)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add destination user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbDestName, dwDestNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (DestName)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (keyB)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add sending user name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbSendName, dwSendNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (SendName)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add "phase 2" text to hash.
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if(!CryptHashData(hHash, "phase 2", 7, 0)) 1
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (phase2)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
II Complete the hash computation and retrieve the hash value.
dwHashLen = HASH_SIZE;
if(!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, pbHash, &dwHashLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Transmit the hash value to the sending user.
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbHash, dwHashLen, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof (cli-
entaddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Wait for the sending user to respond.
// Receive a hash value from the sending user and place it in
II 'pbSendHashValue'. Set 'dwSendHashLen' to the number of bytes in
/I the hash value.
//printf("Receiving 2nd hash value.\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbSendHash, MAXLEN, 0)) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during recv.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
dwSendHashLen=lettersent;
// Verify hash value received from the sending user.
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to compare)!\n",
GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
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II Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (hKeyB)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
/I Add sending user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbSendName, dwSendNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (sendName)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add destination user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbDestName, dwDestNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (destName)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
I Add "phase 3" text to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, "phase 3", 7, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (phase 3)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
II Complete the hash computation and retrieve the hash value.
dwHashLen = HASH_SIZE;
if(!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, pbHash, &dwHashLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
/I Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
I-
// Compare the hash value received from the sending user with the
HI hash value that we just computed. If they do not match, then
// terminate the protocol.
if(dwHashLen!=dwSendHashLen II memcmp(pbHash, pbSendHash, dwHashLen)) {
printf("Key exchange protocol failed in phase 3 !\n");
printf("Aborting protocol!\n");
return;
}
//printf("Hash validated.\n");
// Create a shared session key to be used by the two users for
// exchanging encrypted messages. Both users must agree on the
/I algorithm and parameters that this key is to use.
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I-
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALGMD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (shared key)!\n",
GetLastError());
goto done;
}
II Add session key A to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyA, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyA)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyB)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Complete the hash computation and derive a session key from it.
II The CRYPT_EXPORTABLE flag is not specified here because the key
// is not generally exported out of the CSP.
//Modified to CRYPT_EXPORTABLE from 0
if(!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALGRC4, hHash, CRYPT_EXPORTABLE, &hSharedKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDeriveKey!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Use the shared key to send encrypted messages to the other user.
/* send stuff */
printf("Successful Key Exchange.\n");
// get file length
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, RecvBuffer, 20, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, RecvBuffer, strlen(RecvBuffer),
0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr,
sizeof (clientaddr)))<0)
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printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
ReceiveLen=atol(RecvBuffer);
// get file name
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, RecvBuffer, 20, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, RecvBuffer, strlen(recvfilename),
0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr,
sizeof (clientaddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
strncpy(recvfilename, RecvBuffer, lettersent);
/open file
if((hRecvFile=fopen(recvfilename,"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening key destination file!\n");
}
/I receive file
eof = 0;
BytesReceived =0;
do {
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, RecvBuffer, BUFFERSIZE, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
II decrypt data
if(!((BytesReceived +lettersent)<ReceiveLen))
{
eof = 1;}
if(!CryptDecrypt(hSharedKey, 0, eof, 0, RecvBuffer, &lettersent)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDecrypt!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
fwrite(RecvBuffer, 1, lettersent, hRecvFile);
if(ferror(hRecvFile)) {
printf("Error writing data to destination file!\n");
goto done;
}
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BytesReceived = BytesReceived +lettersent;
} while(BytesReceived<ReceiveLen );
// Close source file.
if(hSource != NULL) fclose(hSource);
// Close destination file.
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
if(hRecvFile != NULL) fclose(hRecvFile);
I while(l); //repeat this large loop
done:
// Destroy session key.
// Destroy handle to sending user's public key.
if(!CryptDestroyKey(hSharedKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyKey !\n", GetLastErroro);
exit (2);
// Release provider handle.
if(!CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptReleaseContext!\n", GetLastErroro);
exit (2);
// Close source file.
if(hSource != NULL) fclose(hSource);
// Close destination file.
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
if (closesocket(connectedport) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during closesocket.\n", WSAGetLastError());
exit (3);
if (closesocket(listensocket) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during closesocket.\n", WSAGetLastError());
exit (3);
I
}
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Appendix D.2. Three Phase Session Key Exchange Protocol
(Client)
#define _WIN32 WINNT 0x0400
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <iostream.h> II for command line arguments
#define NAME_SIZE 256
#define BLOB_SIZE 512
#define BLOCK_SIZE 200
#define TEMPFILE "delme.txt"
#define DEFAULT_LOCAL_CERTFILE "mycert.txt"
#define DEFAULTSIGNATURE_KEYFILE "sign.key"
#define DEFAULTSERVERIP "18.172.0.225"
#define NAME_LEN 60
#define HASH_SIZE 256
// Prototypes
BOOL verifycertificate(HCRYPTPROV hProv,char *filetocheck, char *signaturekeyfilename,
BYTE *pbKeyBlob, DWORD *dwBlobLen,
BYTE *pbDestUserName, DWORD *dwDestUserNameLen);
BOOL askforserverip(char *serveripaddress);
BOOL searchfor(int argc, char *argv[],
char searchstring[2], int *whicharg);
// searchfor finds a switch in the command line and returns the
// argument number of the switch
// searchfor returns true if the searchstring is found
// argc (int) = number of command line items (excluding call)
// argv (*char) = string values of these command line items
// searchstring[2] (char) = switch to be searched for i.e. "-g"
// whicharg (int) = returns the value of the found arg
BOOL searchfor(int argc, char *argv[],
char searchstring[2], int *whicharg)
{
int count;
// Display each command-line argument.
for( count = 1; count < argc; count++)
if (memcmp(argv[count], searchstring, 2) == 0)
{
*whicharg = count;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
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BOOL askforserverip(char *serveripaddress){
char *dotfinder, *testipaddress;
int dotcount, found3dots;
int scannedchar;
// Read in server IP address
dotcount = 0;
found3dots = 0;
testipaddress=serveripaddress;
while (dotcount < 3){
dotfinder = strchr(testipaddress, '.');
if (dotfinder == NULL){
found3dots = 1;
dotcount = 3;
testipaddress = _strinc(dotfinder);
dotcount++;
}
if (found3dots == 1){
printf("IP address not formatted correctly.\n");
return FALSE;
}
else
{
return TRUE;
}
// verifycertificate returns 1 if certificate checks okay, 0 otherwise
// input hProv-HCRYPTPROV cryptography provider
// input filetocheck-char null-terminated string of certificate to verify
// output publickeyblob-public key blob of destination user
II output dwBlobLen-Length of public key blob
// output pbDestUserName-null-terminated string for destination user name
// output dwDestUserNameLen-Length of name
BOOL verifycertificate(HCRYPTPROV hProv,char *filetocheck, char *signaturekeyfilename,
BYTE *pbKeyBlob, DWORD *dwBlobLen,
BYTE *pbDestUserName, DWORD *dwDestUserNameLen){
FILE *hDest = NULL;
FILE *hSign = NULL;
#define BUFFER_SIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) // Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
#define SDESCRIPTION "Hash of name and key"
BYTE pbSignKeyBlob[BLOB_SIZE];
DWORD dwSignBlobLen;
HCRYPTKEY hSignature = 0;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
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DWORD PublicKeyLen, HashLen, NameLen;
BYTE FilePublicKey[BLOB_SIZE], FileHash[BLOB_SIZE], FileName[NAME_SIZE];
//char signaturekeyfilename[NAME_LEN];
int scannedchar;
int whicharg;
do{
/I Open source file.
if((hSign=fopen(signaturekeyfilename,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening source file!\n");
I
} while (hSign==NULL);
// Read signature key blob length from source file and allocate memory.
fread(&dwSignBlobLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSign);
if(ferror(hSign) II feof(hSign)) {
printf("Error reading signature length!\n");
return(FALSE);
pbSignKeyBlob == malloc(dwSignBlobLen);
if(pbSignKeyBlob == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
I
// Read signature key blob from source file.
fread(pbSignKeyBlob, 1, dwSignBlobLen, hSign);
if(ferror(hSign) II feof(hSign)) {
printf("Error reading signature blob!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
// Import signature key blob into CSP.
if(!CryptImportKey(hProv, pbSignKeyBlob, dwSignBlobLen, 0, 0, &hSignature)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey!\n", GetLastError());
return(FALSE);
I
// check certificate
printf("Verifying certificate.\n");
if((hDest=fopen(filetocheck,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening Certificate file for examination!\n");
return(FALSE);
// Allocate memory for Hash
fread(&HashLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
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FileHash == malloc(HashLen);
if(FileHash == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory !\n");
return(FALSE);
// Allocate memory for Name
fread(&NameLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading file header!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
FileName == malloc(NameLen);
if(FileName == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
// Allocate memory for Public Key Blob
fread(&PublicKeyLen, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading Public Key!\n");
return(FALSE);
FilePublicKey == malloc(PublicKeyLen);
if(FilePublicKey == NULL) {
printf("Out of memory !\n");
return(FALSE);
}
// Read signature
fread(FileHash, 1, HashLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading hash!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
// Read name
fread(FileName, 1, NameLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading name!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
// Read public key
fread(FilePublicKey, 1, PublicKeyLen, hDest);
if(ferror(hDest) II feof(hDest)) {
printf("Error reading key!\n");
return(FALSE);
}
May 23, 1997
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to send)!\n", GetLastError());
return(FALSE);
}
// Add Sender's Public Key to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, FilePublicKey, PublicKeyLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastErroro);
return(FALSE);
}
// Add Sender's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, FileName, NameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Name)!\n", GetLastErroro);
return(FALSE);
}
if(!CryptVerifySignature(hHash, FileHash, HashLen, hSignature, SDESCRIPTION, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptVerifySignature!\n", GetLastError());
printf("Certificate invalid\n");
return(FALSE);
//delete file
}
else
{
printf("Certificate %s verified and ready to use\n",filetocheck);
memcpy(pbKeyBlob,FilePublicKey,PublicKeyLen);
*dwBlobLen=PublicKeyLen;
memcpy(pbDestUserName,FileName,NameLen);
*dwDestUserNameLen=NameLen;
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
if(hSign != NULL) fclose(hSign);
return(TRUE);
}
void main(int argc, // Number of strings in array argv
char *argv[], // Array of command-line argument strings
char *envp[] ) // Array of environment variable strings
{
//sockets declarations
#define DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT 1625
#define DEFAULTCLIENT_PORT 1626
#define MAXLEN 1000
#define NAME_SIZE 256
#define CERT_SIZE 512
#define HASH_SIZE 256
#define BUFFERSIZE (BLOCK_SIZE+16) 1 Give buffer 16 bytes of extra
#define IP_ADDRESSLEN 20
struct sockaddr_in serveraddr, clientaddr;
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int connectedport, connecterror, lettersent;
int localportnumber, connectportnumber;
BYTE pboutbuffer[MAXLEN];
//Winsock Version Verification
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
int err;
//Cryptography declarations
HCRYPTPROV hProv = 0;
BYTE pbDestName[NAME.SIZE];
//char pbDestName[NAME_SIZE];
DWORD dwDestNameLen;
BYTE pbSendName[NAMESIZE];
//char pbSendName[NAME_SIZE];
DWORD dwSendNameLen;
HCRYPTKEY hDestPubKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hMyPubKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hSharedKey = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hKeyA = 0;
HCRYPTKEY hKeyB = 0;
BYTE pbKeyBlob[BLOB_SIZE];
BYTE pbCert[CERTSIZE];
DWORD dwBlobLen;
BYTE pbHash[HASH_SIZE];
DWORD dwHashLen;
BYTE pbDestHash[HASH_SIZE];
DWORD dwDestHashLen;
HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
DWORD Certlength;
DWORD Certpartlength;
FILE *hSource = NULL;
FILE *hRemoteCert = NULL;
FILE *hDest = NULL;
FILE *hDataFile = NULL;
int eof = 0;
/I room for padding, etc.
BYTE pbBuffer[BUFFERSIZE];
char ReadBuffer[BUFFERSIZE];
DWORD dwCount;
char localcertfilename[60], keyfilename[60], remotecertfilename[60];
char signaturekeyfilename[60];
char filetosend[60];
int scannedchar;
DWORD dwSourceLen;
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int whicharg;
char serveripaddress[IP_ADDRESS_LEN];
II Read in IP address
H IP is defined with -i, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-i", &whicharg))
strcpy(serveripaddress, (strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
else
strcpy(serveripaddress, DEFAULT_SERVERIP);
if (!(askforserverip(serveripaddress)))
{
goto done;
/I Read in client (local) port number
// client port is defined with -p, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-p", &whicharg))
localportnumber = atoi(_stminc(argv[whicharg],2));
else
localportnumber = DEFAULTCLIENT_PORT;
//Read in client (local) port number
// client port is defined with -p, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-s", &whicharg))
connectportnumber = atoiLstminc(argv[whicharg],2));
else
connectportnumber = DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT;
//Read in LocalCertificate
// client port is defined with -m, DEFAULT otherwise
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-m", &whicharg))
{
if((hSource=fopen((_strninc(argv[whicharg],2))":rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening your certificate file!\n");
goto done;
}
strcpy(localcertfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
else
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if((hSource=fopen(DEFAULT LOCAL_CERTFILE,"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening your certificate file!\n");
goto done;
}
strcpy(localcertfilename, DEFAULTLOCAL_CERTFILE);}
II Read in junk filename
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-j", &whicharg))
{
if((hRemoteCert=fopen((_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)),"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening Writing file!\n");
I
strcpy(remotecertfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
}
else
{
if((hRemoteCert=fopen(TEMPFILE,"wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening certificate destination file!\n");
}
strcpy(remotecertfilename,TEMPFILE);
}
// Get handle to the default provider.
if(!CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptAcquireContext!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Obtain the destination user's exchange public key. Import it into
// the CSP and place a handle to it in 'hDestPubKey'.
// Place the sending user's name in 'pbSendName' and set
// 'dwSendNameLen' to the number of bytes in it.
//Initiate connection
//Check versions of Winsock
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD( 1 11 );
err = WSAStartup( wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if( err != 0) {
printf("Error %d during Startup\n", WSAGetLastError());
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
return;
I
/* Confirm that the WinSock DLL supports 2.0.*/
/* Note that if the DLL supports versions greater */
/* than 2.0 in addition to 2.0, it will still return */
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/* 2.0 in wVersion since that is the version we */
/* requested. */
if ( LOBYTE( wsaData.wVersion) != 1 II
HIBYTE( wsaData.wVersion ) != 1) {
printf("Could not find useable Winsock DLL\n");
/* Tell the user that we couldn't find a useable */
/* WinSock DLL. */
WSACleanup();
return;
}
/* The WinSock DLL is acceptable. Proceed. */
connectedport = socket (AFJNET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (connectedport < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during create\n", WSAGetLastError();
goto done;
I
printf("\nSocket created.\n");
serveraddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serveraddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(serveripaddress);
serveraddr.sin_port = htons ((short)connectportnumber);
clientaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
clientaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_ANY);
//client.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("18.172.0.225");
clientaddr.sin_port = htons ((short)localportnumber);
if (bind(connectedport, (struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof (clientaddr))<O)
{
printf("Error %d during bind.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
printf("Socket bound.\n");
if ((connecterror=connect(connectedport, (struct sockaddr *) &serveraddr, sizeof (serveraddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during connect.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
printf("Connected to host.\n");
printf("Sending my certificate.\n");
// Get certificate length from file header
fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+sizeof(DWORD);
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fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+Certlength+sizeof(DWORD);
fread(&Certpartlength, sizeof(DWORD), 1, hSource);
Certlength=Certpartlength+Certlength+sizeof(DWORD);
//rewind to start and read again
rewind(hSource);
dwCount = fread(pboutbuffer, 1, Certlength, hSource);
if(ferror(hSource)) I
printf("Error reading data from source file!\n");
goto done;
eof=feof(hSource);
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pboutbuffer, Certlength, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<O)
//if ((lettersent= send (connectedport, outbuffer, strlen(outbuffer), 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Wait for the destination user to respond.
// Receive a key blob containing certificate
printf("Receiving remote certificate\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbCert, CERT_SIZE, 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during receive of certificate.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Write data to destination file.
fwrite(pbCert, 1, lettersent, hRemoteCert);
if(ferror(hRemoteCert)) {
printf("Error writing data to remote certificate file!\n");
goto done;
}
if(hRemoteCert != NULL) fclose(hRemoteCert);
//Signature key filename -S
if (searchfor(argc, argv, "-S", &whicharg))
{
strcpy(signaturekeyfilename, (_strninc(argv[whicharg],2)));
}
else
{
strcpy(signaturekeyfilename, DEFAULTSIGNATUREKEYFILE);
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if (!verifycertificate(hProv, remotecertfilename, signaturekeyfilename,
pbKeyBlob, &dwBlobLen,
pbSendName, &dwSendNameLen))
{
printf("Could not verify certificate.\n");
goto done;
I
II Import key blob into CSP.
if(!CryptImportKey(hProv, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0, 0, &hDestPubKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
//Do I need this line? I'm overwriting the DestPubKey
if(!CryptGetUserKey(hProv, AT_KEYEXCHANGE, &hMyPubKey)) {
printf("Error %x during GetUserKey!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Obtain the destination user's name. This is usually done at the
// same time as the public key was obtained. Place this in
// 'pbDestName' and set 'dwDestNameLen' to the number of bytes in
// the name.
//your name must be second item (item after function call)
if (argc<2)
{
printf("No name specified.\n");
goto done;
}
else
{
strcpy(pbDestName, argv[1]);
dwDestNameLen=strlen(pbDestName);
// Place the sending user's name in 'pbSendName' and set
// 'dwSendNameLen' to the number of bytes in it.
// Create a random session key (session key A). Because this key will
// be used solely for key exchange and not encryption, it
// does not matter which algorithm you specify here.
if(!CryptGenKey(hProv, CALG_RC2, CRYPTEXPORTABLE, &hKeyA)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGenKey for KeyA!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Export session key A into a simple key blob.
dwBlobLen = BLOB_SIZE;
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if(!CryptExportKey(hKeyA, hDestPubKey, SIMPLEBLOB, 0, pbKeyBlob, &dwBlobLen)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptExportKey for KeyA!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
// Send key blob containing session key A to the destination user.
printf("Sending Session Key A.\n");
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<O)
//if ((lettersent= send (connectedport, outbuffer, strlen(outbuffer), 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Wait for the destination user to respond.
// Receive a key blob containing session key B from the destination
// user and place it in 'pbKeyBlob'. Set 'dwBlobLen' to the number
// of bytes in the key blob.
printf("Receiving Session Key B\n\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbKeyBlob, MAXLEN, 0)) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during recv.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
dwBlobLen=lettersent;
// Receive a hash value from the destination user and place it in
// 'pbHashValue'. Set 'dwHashLen' to the number of bytes in the hash
// value.
printf("Receiving 1st hash value.\n");
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbDestHash, MAXLEN, 0)) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during recv.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
dwDestHashLen=lettersent;
// Import the key blob into the CSP.
if(!CryptlmportKey(hProv, pbKeyBlob, dwBlobLen, 0, 0, &hKeyB)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptImportKey for KeyB!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
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// Verify hash value received from the destination user.
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to compare to received)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
// Add session key A to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyA, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyA)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add destination user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbDestName, dwDestNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (destName)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
// Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyB)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add sending user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbSendName, dwSendNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (sendName)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add "phase 2" text to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, "phase 2", 7, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (Phase 2)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Complete the hash computation and retrieve the hash value.
dwHashLen = HASH_SIZE;
if(!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, pbHash, &dwHashLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
// Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
// Compare the hash value received from the destination user with
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H the hash value that we just computed. If they do not match, then
// terminate the protocol.
if(dwHashLen !=dwDestHashLen II memcmp(pbHash, pbDestHash, dwHashLen)) {
printf("Key exchange protocol failed in phase 2!\n");
printf("Aborting protocol!\n");
return;
}
printf("Hash values verified.\n");
// Compute hash to be sent to the destination user.
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_MD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (to send)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (KeyB)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
// Add sending user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbSendName, dwSendNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (SendName)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add destination user's name to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, pbDestName, dwDestNameLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashData (DestName)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Add "phase 3" text to hash.
if(!CryptHashData(hHash, "phase 3", 7, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (phase3)!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
// Complete the hash computation and retrieve the hash value.
dwHashLen = HASH_SIZE;
if(!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, pbHash, &dwHashLen, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptGetHashParam!\n", GetLastErroro);
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goto done;
// Send the hash value to the destination user.
printf("Sending 2nd Hash Value\n\n");
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbHash, dwHashLen, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof (cli-
entaddr)))<0)
//if ((lettersent= send (connectedport, outbuffer, strlen(outbuffer), 0))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
// Create a shared session key to be used by both users for
// exchanging encrypted messages. Both users must agree on the
// algorithm and parameters that this key is to use.
/-
// Create hash object.
if(!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALGQMD5, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptCreateHash (for shared key)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
printf("Creating Shared Session Key\n");
// Add session key A to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyA, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (for shared key, hKeyA)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Add session key B to hash.
if(!CryptHashSessionKey(hHash, hKeyB, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptHashSessionKey (for shared key, hKeyB)!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Complete the hash computation and derive a session key from it.
// The CRYPTEXPORTABLE flag is not specified here because the key
// usually is not exported out of the CSP.
// changed to CRYPT_EXPORTABLE from 0
if(!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_RC4, hHash, CRYPT_EXPORTABLE, &hSharedKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDeriveKey!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
// Destroy the hash object.
if(!CryptDestroyHash(hHash)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyHash!\n", GetLastErroro);
goto done;
}
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// Use the shared key to send encrypted messages to the other user.
printf("Successful Key Exchange.\n");
//get filename to encrypt & send
II Read in data file
if (argc<3)
{
printf("No sending file specified!\n");
goto done;
I
else
{
if((hDataFile=fopen(argv [2],"rb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening file to send!\n");
}
//need to remove the path
strcpy(filetosend,argv[2]);
I
II Encrypt source file and send it
dwSourceLen=0;
do {
// Read up to BLOCK_SIZE bytes from source file.
dwCount = fread(ReadBuffer, 1, BLOCK_SIZE, hDataFile);
if(ferror(hDataFile)) {
printf("Error reading data!\n");
goto done;
I
eof=feof(hDataFile);
dwSourceLen=dwSourceLen+dwCount;
printf("source length %d\n",dwSourceLen);
} while(!feof(hDataFile));
// send file length
_itoa(dwSourceLen, pbBuffer, 10);
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbBuffer, strlen(pbBuffer), 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
I
// other side is reading both buffers together
//install checkback
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbBuffer, 50, 0))<0)
I
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printf("Error %d during transmission of filelength dataAn", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
I
if (!(atol(pbBuffer)== (long)dwSourceLen)){
printf("Data corrupted. Aborting.\n");
goto done;
}
strcpy(pbBuffer,filetosend);
printf("filetosend: %s\n", filetosend);
// send file name
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbBuffer, strlen(pbBuffer), 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<O)
{
printf("Error %d during sendAn", WSAGetLastError());
goto done;
//verify correct name received
if ((lettersent= recv (connectedport, pbBuffer, 50, 0))<0)
I
printf("Error %d during transmission of filename data.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
I
if (!(strcmp(pbBuffer,filetosend)==0)){
printf("Data corrupted. Aborting.\n");
goto done;
I
printf("Sending file.\n");
rewind(hDataFile);
// send file
do {
II Read up to BLOCK_SIZE bytes from source file.
dwCount = fread(pbBuffer, 1, BLOCK_SIZE, hDataFile);
if(ferror(hDataFile)) {
printf("Error reading data!\n");
goto done;
I
eof=feof(hDataFile);
printf("pbBuffer: %s\n", pbBuffer);
if(!CryptEncrypt(hSharedKey, 0, eof, 0, pbBuffer, &dwCount, BUFFERSIZE)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptEncrypt!\n", GetLastError());
goto done;
}
if ((lettersent= sendto (connectedport, pbBuffer, (int)dwCount, 0,(struct sockaddr *) &clientaddr, sizeof
(clientaddr)))<0)
{
printf("Error %d during send.\n", WSAGetLastErroro);
goto done;
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I
} while(!feof(hDataFile));
done:
I Destroy session key.
if(!CryptDestroyKey(hSharedKey)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptDestroyKey !\n", GetLastError());
exit (2);
// Release provider handle.
if(!CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0)) {
printf("Error %x during CryptReleaseContext!\n", GetLastError());
exit (2);
// Close source file.
if(hSource != NULL) fclose(hSource);
II Close Certificate file
if(hRemoteCert != NULL) fclose(hRemoteCert);
// Close data fil.e
if(hDataFile != NULL) fclose(hDataFile);
// Close destination file.
if(hDest != NULL) fclose(hDest);
if (closesocket(connectedport) < 0)
{
printf("Error %d during closesocket.\n", WSAGetLastError());
exit (3);
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